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"Let Me Count the Ways"!: IsThere a Constitutional
Basis for Telling the Secretary of Commerce to Make
an Upward Statistical Revision inthe Census?
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by Jay E. Grenig

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School, Milwaukee, WI;
(414) 288-5377.

ISSUE
Is the decision of the United States
Secretary of Commerce not to
undertake a statistical adjustment of
the 1990 census constitutional?
FACTS
Each decennial census has
inevitably contained errors resulting
from, among other things, nonreturned census forms and the lack of
success of other methods employed
to produce an accurate count of the
nation's population. In other words,
in each census, some persons are
not counted at all, while nonexistent
persons are counted and others are
counted more than once. It is
apparent, therefore, that the census,
no matter how conducted, provides
only an estimate of the nation's
"true" population.
The census has been found to
undercount members of ethnic and
racial minority groups more severely than members of other demographic groups. This phenomenon,
known as the differential undercount, has occurred with every census since at least 1940, the year in
which the United States Bureau of
the Census (the "Bureau")
began measuring the differential
undercount.
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In preparation for the 1980 census,
the Bureau, an agency of the United
States Department of Commerce
(the "Commerce Department" or the
"DOC"), hoped that a combination
of outreach efforts and attempts to
focus energy on improving the count
in areas such as the inner cities,
where the differential undercount
was thought to be particularly great,
would lead to a reduction of both the
overall undercount and the differential undercount. When those efforts
failed, the Bureau decided to create
a program for the 1990 census that
would address the problem through
other techniques.
By 1984, the Bureau had developed
an internal research plan to aid it in
deciding whether or not the 1990
census should be statistically adjusted in order to reduce the differential
undercount. The Bureau created an
Undercount Steering Committee and
an Undercount Research Staff to
(Continued on Page 191)

Several states and cities
sued the United States
Secretary of Commerce,
seeking to compel the
Secretary to undertake
statistical estimation procedures designed to correct anticipated errors in
the 1990 census. In 1991,
the Secretary refused to
4

substitute statistically
estimated population
totals for the 1990
census, despite claims
that the 1990 census
undercounted racial and
ethnic minority groups.
Now the Supreme Court
is called on to determine
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if the Secretary will be
required to justify the
nonadjustment decision.
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consider the problem and sought
advice from outside experts and
organizations such as the American
Statistical Association and the
National Academy of Science. The
Bureau also consulted state and local
governments, planned an extensive
advertising campaign, designed a
more ethnically inclusive census
questionnaire, and developed an
automated geographic control
system to help assure accurate and
timely maps and geographic files for
the 1990 census.
In due course, the Bureau decided
that the post-enumeration survey
(the "PES") method was the best
available tool for adjusting the initial
census figures. Accordingly, the
initial census enumeration would be
followed by a second measurement,
the PES, which would attempt to
measure that rate at which people
were omitted or erroneously counted by the initial census in order to
determine the net undercount rate.
The net undercount rate would
indicate the appropriate amount by
which the census should be adjusted.
A major threat to the accuracy of
the census occurs when individuals
who have different probabilities of
being counted are placed in a single
category. The Bureau addresses this
problem by using the technique of
"poststratification," a technique in
which highly specific categories are
created and all individuals with a
similar likelihood of being counted
are placed in a specific category.
These categories, or poststrata, are
defined by age, sex, race, Hispanic
origin, housing tenure, type of
environment, and geographic region.
For the 1990 census, application of
the technique resulted in a total of
1,392 exhaustive and mutuallyexclusive poststrata to be applied to
the number of households and
individuals composing the PES.
In the event that the PES yielded
anomalous results from a statistical
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perspective, the Bureau decided to
apply a statistical technique known
as "smoothing." Statistical smoothing is a procedure designed to minimize the effects of sampling error by
reducing the difference between the
results produced by the PES and the
results that would be obtained if the
entire population were surveyed.
By May 1987, the Bureau determined
that an adjustment of the 1990
census using the above-described
statistical procedures would be feasible and should be undertaken in the
forthcoming census. However, high
ranking Commerce Department officials decided against any adjustment
in the 1990 census. On October 30,
1987, the DOC announced its
decision that the 1990 census would
not be statistically adjusted.
That decision prompted a federal
lawsuit filed in 1988 by the City
and State of New York and a host of
others (the "New York Forces").
Named as defendants were the
Bureau and the Commerce
Department, and a number of
other Executive Branch officials
(collectively, the "Government").
The States of Wisconsin and
Oklahoma entered the lawsuit in
support of the Government.
The New York Forces contended
that the announcement of the
Secretary of the Commerce
Department (the "Secretary") not to
adjust the 1990 census violated the
Constitution. Complaining principally of an anticipated loss in
congressional representation and an
anticipated deprivation of funds to
be distributed under federal
programs that use census figures,
the New York Forces challenged the
methodology to be used in the 1990
census and sought to enjoin the
census - that is, to keep it from
going forward - unless the initial
census was subject to adjustment, if
an adjustment proved necessary.

Not surprisingly, both sides engaged
in strategic and not-so-strategic
maneuvering which included the
Government's unsuccessful attempt
to have the case dismissed. In
permitting the case to go forward,
the New York district court hearing
the case ruled that it would review
the Secretary's decision against statistically adjusting the preliminary
census figure (the "nonadjustment
decision") under the arbitrary-orcapricious standard of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
5 U.S.C § 706(2)(A) (1988) (The
Administrative Procedure Act
provides for judicial review to any
"person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action. . ." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
The Bureau and the other federal
entities sued in these cases are agencies under the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 701.)
The parties then entered into a
stipulation under which the New
York Forces withdrew their motion
to enjoin the 1990 census and the
Secretary would reconsider the
decision against adjusting the 1990
census. The stipulation required
the Government to conduct a PES
of not fewer than 150,000 households. Between the time the
New York Forces sued in 1988 and
the date of the stipulation in July
1989, a new Secretary, Robert
Mosbacher, had been appointed.
Accordingly, the stipulation
required that the new Secretary
would reconsider the earlier nonadjustment decision "with an open
mind, without any prejudgment."
The stipulation also called for the
Secretary's assessment of any
proposed adjustment to be in
accordance with a set of published
guidelines to be developed promptly by the DOC, articulating the
relevant technical and nontechnical
statistical and policy grounds for
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any decision on whether or not to
adjust the initial 1990 decennial
census enumeration.
The Commerce Department also
was required to appoint and fund an
eight-member Special Advisory
Panel made up of statistical and
demographic experts who would
advise the DOC with respect to
achieving an accurate final census.
In particular, the Special Advisory
Panel would advise the DOC on the
need for any adjustment and, if
needed, would assist in developing
appropriate methods of adjustment.
If the Secretary eventually decided
against an adjustment to the census,
the decision was to be accompanied
by a detailed explanatory statement.
Following the 1989 stipulation, the
Commerce Department appointed
the Special Advisory Panel.
As provided by the stipulation, the
DOC also developed, published, and
received comments on its guidelines
for conducting the 1990 census,
which were promulgated in March
1990. Among other things, the
guidelines provided that the census
would be deemed the most accurate
count of the population unless an
adjusted count is shown to be more
accurate than the initial census enumeration. They provided that the
1990 census could be adjusted if the
adjusted counts were consistent and
complete across all jurisdictional
levels, federal, state, and local. The
guidelines provided that any adjustment of the 1990 census should take
into account the effects an adjustment might have on future census
efforts. In addition, no adjustment of
the 1990 census could be made if it
would violate the Constitution or
applicable federal statutes.
In April 1990, the New York Forces'
challenged the Government's guidelines, contending that they violated
the 1989 stipulation because they
were vague and manifestly biased

against any adjustment to the 1990
census. The New York Forces were
successful in obtaining a judgment
from the district court that a statistical adjustment to the census would
not violate the Constitution or any
federal statutes. But as to the things
that really mattered to the New York
Forces, the district court ruled that
while the Guidelines were vague and
while some of them "lend themselves easily to abuse, they satisfied
the Government's obligations under
the stipulation and were not unduly
biased against adjustment. 739
F. Supp. 761, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
In conducting the 1990 census, the
Bureau used a four-step process for
the initial population enumeration.
First, the Bureau compiled a list of
every household in the nation, each
one of which would receive a census
questionnaire. Second, census
questionnaires were mailed in
conjunction with an advertising
campaign encouraging participation.
Third, the Bureau undertook a
follow-up mailing to households that
had failed to return the census
questionnaire. Finally, the Bureau
conducted largely in-person interviews in households that had not
responded to the earlier mailings.
The Bureau also implemented the
PES as required by the 1989 stipulation. In preparation for the PES, the
Bureau selected approximately
5,000 blocks to achieve what it
deemed an appropriate sample size
for each of the 1,392 poststrata
previously developed. Bureau
employees visited each sample block
and recorded all the housing units,
a total of 170,000.
Bureau interviewers visited each
address in the sample blocks to
obtain information regarding the
residency status of household members. The Bureau then compared the
data obtained in the PES visits with
the information collected in the initial

enumeration of the sample blocks.
From this comparison, the Bureau
estimated rates of omission and rates
of erroneous overcounting and
calculated a net rate for each
poststratum. The Bureau used these
results to develop an adjustment
factor for each of the 1,392 previously developed poststrata. The adjustment factor, when multiplied by the
population count as indicated by the
initial enumeration, would reflect
the variations found in the PES.
After applying a variety of statistical
manipulations, the Bureau concluded that the overall national population had been undercounted by
2.1 percent, or some 5.3 million
persons out of a total population of
some 255 million persons. The
national undercount figure was
reduced later to 1.6 percent.
The undercount rate, however, was
greater for racial and ethnic minorities within the population. Hispanics
were undercounted by an estimated
5.2 percent, Native Americans by an
estimated 5.0 percent, African
Americans by an estimated 4.8
percent, and Asian-Pacific Islanders
by 3.1 percent. These undercount
estimates compared to an estimated
1.7 percent undercount rate for
non-African Americans and an
estimated 1.2 percent undercount
rate for non-Hispanic whites.
The impact of the differential undercount was greater in those areas in
which racial and ethnic minorities
were concentrated. If the census
were adjusted by the PES undercount rates, Arizona and California
would each gain a seat in the House
of Representatives; Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin would each lose a seat.
The Secretary decided not to adjust
the 1990 census to reflect the undercounting estimates from the PES, in
part because there was no consensus
among the Secretary's advisors as to
(Continued on Page 193)
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the soundness of the PES estimates,
including a lack of consensus regarding the statistical manipulations
applied to the PES data. Accordingly,
the population count reported to the
President by the Secretary was
249,632,692 rather than the
254,902,609 indicated by the
PES-supplemented enumeration.
The Secretary's decision was issued
on July 15, 1991, in a 178-page document. The Secretary acknowledged
that the enumeration "was lower
than average among certain segments of our population," but stated
that if "we change the counts by a
computerized statistical process, we
abandon a 200-year tradition of how
we actually count people."
The Secretary acknowledged that
the PES-indicated adjustments
would appear to make the aggregate
national count more accurate,
reflecting more accurately both the
total population of the country and
ethnic subpopulations. However, he
concluded that statistical analyses
performed by the Bureau, although
of uncertain reliability, supported
the superior accuracy of the
unadjusted census when distributive
accuracy is considered, i.e., accuracy at the state and local levels.
The Secretary defined distributive
accuracy as "getting most nearly
correct the proportions of people in
different areas."
The Secretary declined to make any
adjustment because distributive
accuracy would be not increased.
For purposes of state representation
in Congress, distributive accuracy
was considered paramount because
it bore directly on the total number
of Representatives allocated to
the states.
The New York Forces renewed their
challenges to the census, but this
time they were joined by a contingent of new opponents led by City of
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Atlanta and the Florida House of
Representatives, both of which filed
lawsuits. The three lawsuits were
consolidated and a 13-day trial held
before the New York federal district
court which had been hearing the
suit brought by the New York Forces.

Granting petitions for writs of
certiorari filed by the State of
Wisconsin, the State of Oklahoma,
and the Commerce Department, the
Supreme Court consolidated the
cases for argument and
decision. 16 S.Ct. 38 (1995).

Finding that "for most purposes the
PES resulted in a more accurate
count - or to be statistically fashionable, a less inaccurate count - than
the original census, the district court
nonetheless upheld the Secretary's
nonadjustment decision because it
was not arbitrary or capricious. 822
F. Supp. 906 (E.D.N.Y 1993).

CASE ANALYSIS
The Constitution requires a census
of the population every 10 years,
providing that the members of the
House of Representatives shall be
apportioned among the states
"according to their respective numbers." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. The
apportionment of Representatives
among the states also determines the
allocation of votes to the states for
the election of the President. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1.

The Second Circuit, by a two-to-one
vote, reversed, holding that the
Secretary had not made a good faith
effort secure an accurate population
count and, thus, failed to achieve the
"Constitution's plain objective of
equal representation for equal
numbers of people." 34 F.3d 1114,
1129 (2d Cir. 1994). Because the
Secretary had not made the requisite
good faith effort, the court concluded
that his nonadjustment decision
could not be upheld unless the
decision was essential to achieve a
legitimate governmental objective.
34 F.3d at 1131.
The Second Circuit majority
explained its decision by noting that
"both the nature of the right and the
nature of the affected classes are
factors that traditionally require that
the Government's action be given
heightened scrutiny: the right to
have one's vote counted equally is
fundamental and constitutionally
protected, and the unadjusted census undercount disproportionately
disadvantages certain identifiable
minority groups." 34 F.3d at 1130.
The court returned the case to the
district court to enable the Secretary
to identify a legitimate interest and
to show that his nonadjustment
decision was essential to advance
that interest.

In addition to these constitutional
purposes, states use census data to
draw boundaries for congressional
and state legislative districts. The
data are also used by local governments to establish districts for other
representative bodies such as city
councils and county boards of
supervisors. In addition, census
data often provide the basis of
allocating federal and state funding
and services.
The Constitution provides that the
decennial census be conducted "in
such Manner as [Congress] shall by
law direct." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Congress has designated the Bureau
as the federal agency to conduct the
census and has provided that the
decennial census shall be conducted
by the Secretary of Commerce "in
such form and content as he may
determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys." 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1988).
Congress, however, has made it clear
that the Secretary cannot use
"the statistical method known as
'sampling"' when determining the
population for purposes of reappor-
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tionment of Representatives.
13 U.S.C. § 195. When a census is
used for purposes other than apportionment, sampling is permissible.
13 U.S.C. § 141. In other words,
with respect to the reapportionment
of Representatives, the census must
reflect an actual, not a samplederived, count of the population.
In addition to the Second Circuit's
decision at issue in this case, two
other federal courts of appeals have
recently considered census-related
matters. In City of Detroit v.
Franklin, 4 F.d 1367 (6th Cir. 1993),
the Sixth Circuit held that the decision by the Secretary not to adjust
census data to account for racially
differentiated undercount was not
arbitrary or capricious. The Seventh
Circuit held that individuals did not
have standing to litigate alleged
minority undercounting in the 1990
census. Tucker v. United States
Dept. of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411
(7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit
commented that the plaintiffs were
not asking the court to decree equality; they were asking the court
"to take sides in a dispute among
statisticians, demographers, and
census officials concerning the
desirability of making a statistical
adjustment to the census headcount." The Supreme Court
declined to review either decision.
The Supreme Court also has
considered census-related cases.
In Franklinv. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788 (1992), the Court held
that census decisions affecting the
apportionment of Congress will be
reviewed for consistency with the
language of the Constitution and
the constitutional goal of equal
representation. In United States
Department of Commerce v.
Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992), the
Court recognized Congress' broad
authority in reapportionment among
the states and recognized that the
standard of complete equality for

each voter announced in Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), had
little usefulness beyond drawing
district lines within a state.
Contending that the constitutional
purpose of the census is to allocate
rights of political representation
based on the distribution of the population among and within the states,
the Government asserts that absent
unequivocal evidence that an adjustment would have improved the
distributive accuracy of the census,
there is no constitutional basis upon
which a court could set aside the
Secretary's nonadjustment decision.
The Government asserts that the
Secretary's emphasis on distributive,
rather than numeric, accuracy and
his determination that the unadjusted figures would be deemed the
more accurate absent a contrary
showing were consistent with the
constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation. Moreover, the Government
stresses that the 1990 census was
among the most accurate in the
nation's 200-year census-taking
history. When viewed in light of the
lack of consensus among the statisticians and demographers advising
the Secretary, the Government
insists that the Secretary made a
good faith effort to achieve an
accurate population count and that
the Second Circuit erred in holding
to the contrary. This is not to suggest, however, that the Government
accepts the good faith standard as
the proper legal test of the
Secretary's nonadjustment decision.
According to the Government, the
arbitrary-or-capricious standard
adopted by the district court is the
proper standard and that the facts
clearly establish that the Secretary's
nonadjustment decision was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
The Government maintains that it
was permissible for the Secretary to
require proof that the adjusted pop-

ulation estimates were more accurate before abandoning the 200-year
practice of using unadjusted figures.
In particular, the Government
argues that when, as in this case, the
procedures selected for taking the
census do not represent a retreat
from past efforts to take an accurate
census, the Constitution does not
create an entitlement to specific,
previously untried, census innovations. According to the Government,
the Secretary's acknowledgment that
an adjustment would have increased
numeric accuracy at the national
level does not evidence
a lack of effort to allocate
Representatives accurately among
the states, since only distributive
accuracy is relevant to the
reapportionment process.
The Government also claims that
the Second Circuit majority erred in
suggesting that equal protection
principles required heightened
scrutiny of the Secretary's decision,
contending that the New York Forces
have not alleged, and the courts
have not found, that either the
Secretary or any other federal
official acted for the purpose of
reducing the electoral power of
minority residents or of otherwise
disadvantaging them. Here, the
Government points out that there
is never an equal protection violation without discriminatory intent,
which, it notes, is absent in
this case.
The New York Forces counter that
the Government's reliance on the
distinction between overall accuracy
and distributive accuracy is of no
constitutional significance because,
in fact, an adjustment would have
increased the distributive accuracy
of census figures for locations that
contain two-thirds of the nation's
population. This fact, they argue,
clearly impacts reapportionment of
Representatives and it is this impact
that establishes the constitutional
(Continued on Page 195)
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violation. Refusing to adjust the census in light of this evidence, suggests
that the Secretary's nonadjustment
decision fails even the arbitrary-orcapricious test.
The New York Forces, however,
insist that the Secretary's nonadjustment decision must be given a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny
because the decision effectively
permits racial and ethnic undercounting to go uncorrected. This, in
turn, affects the reapportionment of
Representatives and the drawing of
congressional and state legislative
districts in ways that compromise
the voting strength of minority
groups. The New York Forces insist
that such a direct assault on equal
protection and the right to vote can
never be tested by the arbitrary-orcapricious standard, a standard that
is entirely too deferential where, as
here, official action strikes directly
at fundamental constitutional rights.
SIGNIFICANCE
These consolidated cases are among
the most significant cases before the
Supreme Court this Term. A decision
for the Government preserves the
status quo until the next census at
the turn of the century. In addition,
a decision for the Government could
be crafted in such a way as to
remove the adjustment issue from
future censuses.
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C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney
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Secretary of the United States
Department of Commerce, Everett
Ehrlich, as Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs of the United
States Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, William J.
Clinton, as President of the United
States, Dan Glickman, as Secretary
of Agriculture, Donna E. Shalala,
as Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Henry Cisneros, as
Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Robert B. Reich, as
Secretary of Labor, Federico Pena,
as Secretary of Transportation,
Richard W. Riley, as Secretary of
Education (Drew S. Days, III,
Solicitor General; Department of
Justice; (202) 514-2217).
For the City of New York (Paul A.
Crotty, Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York; (212) 788-0800).

In support of the State of
Wisconsin, the State of Oklahoma,
and the United States Department
of Commerce et al.
Joint brief of United States
Senators Herb Kohl, Arlen Specter,
and Russell Feingold (Counsel of
Record: Brady C. Williamson;
LaFollette & Sinykin;
(608) 257-3911);
The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (Counsel of Record:
John G. Knoor, III, Chief Deputy
Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
(717) 783-1471).
In support of the City of New York
et al.
The City of Detroit, Michigan
(Counsel of Record: Linda D. Fegins,
Principal Assistant Corporation
Counsel of the City of Detroit,
Michigan; (313) 224-4550);
Joint brief of the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, American Civil Liberties Union,
American Jewish Committee,
NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., the New
York Civil Liberties Union, and the
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc. (Counsel of
Record: Jonathan L. Greenblatt;
Shearman & Sterling;
(212) 848-4000).

A decision for the New York Forces
likely would prompt a slew of lawsuits between the states as they
square off to claim each other's
Representatives. The spectacle of
states descending on federal courts
to fight each other for Representatives
might strike some as unseemly and
could prompt the Court to hold that
the suit presents the type of purely
political question that federal courts
are not empowered to decide. See
Thcker, 958 F.2d at 1419 (Ripple, J.,
concurring) (Constitution squarely
places sole responsibility for
reapportionment on Congress).
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